Brahimi and the quartet closer to failure than success

No one knows the nature of the relations between Lakhdar Brahimi’s mission and the regional quartet comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Turkey in finding a way out of the present Syrian impasse.
Will there be any coordination and exchange of information between the quartet and Brahimi? Who represents the UN and the Arab League? Brahimi is not officially bound by the decisions of the quartet.
Syrians and the Arab world are anxiously looking forward to the result of Brahimi’s mission and the quartet’s efforts to stop the bloodshed and pave the way for a peaceful political future for Syria. Or, at least, if Brahimi and the quartet will succeed in stopping the blood baths as a prelude to a political solution.
Let's begin with Brahimi, who was born in 1934 to witness the phase of Arab countries achieving independence from colonialism and the course of Arab governments including the Syrian regime’s birth and growth. Serving as Algerian foreign minister from 1991 to 1993, he had the opportunity to interact with the Syrian regime from close quarters. Later he was picked for peacemaking tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq and his skill to resolve international crises was acknowledged.
Brahimi’s track records show he is more capable than anyone else of understanding how the Syrian people’s misfortune has reached the heights it has today, particularly under a tyrannical regime over the past 40 years. I am almost certain that he will not succeed in solving the Syrian issue except through securing a temporary cease-fire. That cease-fire will be temporary because the Syrian regime cannot afford to overtly refuse this demand. On the other hand, the Syrian opposition will not accept a cease-fire agreement before the regime agrees to it under international supervision. A lasting cease-fire will not be achieved because the only political solution acceptable to most of the involved parties is President Bashar Assad’s exit. The president is aware of this and therefore refuses to concede to it.
Brahimi made it clear from the very beginning that he is concerned only with a solution and not with individuals. In a talk with the BBC, he said a change in Syria is essential and that the change should be practical and not a symbolic act. He also made it clear that it is not his task to take a decision on who should or should not lead after the change.
In fact, he left enough room for free interpretation of his words for the regime because without this room for interpretation the regime, or even Russia, might refuse to accept Brahimi’s mission.
This latitude for interpretation is necessitated by the international dispute on a solution for the issue and also because of the weakness of the Arabs to find an acceptable solution.
Brahimi intends to reach a political solution but every party involved in the resolution of the conflict will have to pay a price for that solution. The highest price will have to be paid by the regime because it is the strongest party in the dispute and also it is primarily responsible for the security of the people. Besides, it is a regime that hurriedly resorted to the use of weapons against unarmed citizens who were protesting against police excesses in Deraa in March last year.
The regime wants to use Brahimi’s mission as a cover to carry on its plan for a security solution to the issue, especially when the regime realizes that it will fall without using military force. In the meantime, the regime is getting closer to the end of a blind alley, as the idea of Bashar relinquishing his position is gaining ground internationally and regionally as a pre-requisite to any peaceful solution.
The president has lost his legitimacy and he has nothing to cling on to but his military might. On the other hand, it is hardly possible for a president to remain in power after it has become evident that he is directly responsible for all the bloodshed and devastation across the country. It is against any legal, political and moral logic.
The president and his regime are totally responsible for the escalation of violence and heavy-handed repression, which, as a result, turned a people’s peaceful movement to armed confrontations. The total violence was, in fact, triggered by regime’s armed attack on a peaceful protest march last year. The peaceful protests continued over five months while the regime countered them with tanks and other heavy weapons. Domestic, regional and international efforts to persuade the regime to abandon its police and military operations failed. The regime kept on denying that its military and police fired at demonstrators and argued that those who fired at the demonstrators were not the army but some infiltrators.
The regime, which had some misgivings about the demand for a political solution, doubled its armed repression. The regime’s stand resulted in the spread of protests to most of the towns and villages in the country. The protesters and their sympathizers had no other recourse but to arm themselves for self defense, which, in turn, led the country to an impasse.
While a significant number of the population defends themselves against the army, others started fleeing to safe locations outside. A third section of the people submitted to the savageries of the regime in utter fear and frustration.
One wonders if the regime is not responsible for this tragic situation, then who is responsible for it. In fact, the regime’s only concern is to remain in power at any cost.
So the initial question Brahimi has to face is how can there be a solution to the issue when the regime and its henchmen remain in power.
The regional quartet is reminiscent of the international Quartet that supervised Palestine negotiations. That quartet failed because it did not want to be successful except providing a cover to protect Israel’s interests.
Three members of the regional quartet, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, want a practical solution to the Syrian impasse. But the fourth member Iran does not want a solution. As it does not like the idea of being blamed for the failure of the quartet, it wants its ally Iraq to be a member of the quartet and share the blame.
The Syrian regime also does not want the quartet to succeed because that success will amount to surrendering to the Syrian opposition, and accepting the quartet as the sole caretaker of any political operation. It still dreams to end the crisis with force and all it needs is time. It hopes that the quartet and Brahimi will provide it with that time. The two things the regime learned from Syria’s 40 years of neighborly existence with Israel is the efficacy of brutal repression and collective punishment to deal with people’s protests. Copying the Israeli methods of barbarity, the regime razed residential districts in Homs, Aleppo and Deraa, Idlib and rural areas in Damascus. It made public executions and other methods of horrible punishments so that no one dares to support the opposition. Another ploy the regime learned from Israel is to engage in negotiations solely to buy time. The International Quartet has been helping Israel buy time since 2002. Syria itself has been a victim of the buying-time tactic of Israel since Madrid conference in 1991.
The regime hopes that it will get the needed time if its ally Iran keeps on objecting to the decisions of the regional quartet. Iran supports the Syrian regime because the fall of the regime will be the end of Iran’s influence in the eastern Arab world and its influence will be confined to Iraq. The regime’s fall will also lead to the isolation of its Lebanese ally Hezbollah.
The quartet might hope to implement the Yemeni model of solution in Syria. But Syria is totally different from Yemen. In Yemen the opposition’s strength was based on tribal support and not on any sectarian line. The Yemeni regime was set up in such a way that it did not allow Ali Saleh to take total control over police and military forces. That is why Yemen did not slide into a civil war although Saleh attempted to do it. He also did not have any international or regional support. On the other hand, sectarianism permitted the Assad family to tighten its grip on the regime especially on the military and police establishments and link the two establishments with the family’s destiny. Bashar Assad is also supported by sectarian alliances with Iran and Hezbollah apart from winning the support of Russia. Because of its sectarian nature and the blind police support the regime has been able to push the country to the brink of open civil war. This situation points to the fact that any solution to the crisis lies in loosening the sectarian grip of the regime.
Under the shadow of fear about Brahimi’s and the quartet’s failure, the opposition is likely to get more weapons and Syria drown in its own blood. It is common knowledge that the regime is heading for a disastrous collapse. Has anyone told Bashar about this inevitable eventuality? Will Brahimi tell Bashar that he is heading for a total collapse? Why the concerned people are not striving to minimize the price of the regime’s fall instead of hiding the facts behind diplomatic courtesies and political wrangling.

n Courtesy of Al-Hayat newspaper